America between Middle Orient and Asia Pacific in this century(!?)
Nov 6th, 2011 by admin
In a very impressive article Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, express in words: The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans — the Pacific and the Indian — that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world’s population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia.
The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.
For the past decade, U.S. policy has been based on the assumption that the United States and Pakistan shared the strategic goal of extirpating from the leadership of Afghanistan the Taliban and allied terrorist forces. In the end the peace talks remain nascent and riddled with setbacks. Karzai suspended the talks after the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the government’s chief negotiator, which the Afghan officials blamed on the Pakistan-based Haqqani network.
Now the best-case scenario for Afghanistan would be a more decentralized form of governance with more power and responsibility pushed to the provincial, district, and local levels. The result would be that some parts of the country would be well-governed, economically prosperous, and able to provide security and justice to their populations but other parts, less so. The United States might have a continuing presence (is very important for the stability of the region) to help support capable Afghan partners at both the central and local levels. Ironically, this is pretty much what Afghanistan looked like for much of the twentieth century, especially during the reign of Muhammad Zahir Shah (1933-73). For his four decades in power, Afghanistan served as a buffer state between its neighbors, and received substantial international assistance for this useful service. The government in Kabul was a moderating presence on society. Real power lay in the hands of local authorities. Some of them governed well, others poorly, but all of them did so within the context of Afghan customs and cultural norms.
How will look like Afghanistan in the future? Afghanistan’s future will probably look like some version of its past. We envision 3 scenario: (1) Afghanistan might more closely resemble 1960 than 1980 (a period of foreign occupation), (2) 1990 (a time of civil war), or (3) 2000 (an era of Taliban rule).
Securing Pakistan against its military leaders’ nightmare of an Indian threat from both east and west provides a strategic gain, especially when coupled with a possible Kashmir agreement that could lay the groundwork for transforming the hostile relationship with India into one that was merely chilly but improving. Afghanistan has never had sustained good relations with Pakistan, and may once again look to India as a balancer – an all too willing one – when it tires of being guided by Pakistan. And on the Kashmir side, even if the Pakistan government and its army agree to negotiate peace with India – by no means a sure bet – the militant movement in Pakistan includes many spoilers who will try to stir up trouble in Kashmir or elsewhere in India, providing acute temptation to the army to join in.
To improve the odds, the United States would need to seek other international support, appealing to the desire of Pakistan’s international friends to improve Pakistan’s long term economic and security prospects. Bringing European aid donors and other players like China (which has a very good relation with Pakistan) or some of Pakistan’s Arab benefactors would be the ideal path.
The Asian-Pacific Rim has recently experienced an economic slowdown, over the last decade Asia’s economic growth rate was twice that of the world as a whole. This growth has increased competition for both natural resources and markets. Thirty-six percent of U.S. merchandise trade is within the region and over three million American jobs are linked to Asian export markets. Economic growth has fueled an expansion of military technologies and capabilities.
Sovereignty claims to areas such as the Spratly Islands and Parcel Islands have become important due to the resource potential of the surrounding seas. China and five other nations claim parts of the South China Sea, which has strategic significance and potentially sizable petroleum deposits.
The United States has treaty allies in the region, sends ships through the South China Sea regularly, and views the waters as critically strategic and as a U.S. “national interest”. This position, however, infuriated China. At this summer’s ASEAN Regional Forum in Bali, this year, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations celebrated the drafting of an agreement between Southeast Asian states and China to resolve South China Sea disputes peacefully, according to guidelines laid down previously. But the agreement pass around resolution of key issues, and the involvement of the United States as a last-resort guarantor of Southeast Asian states’ rights to the sea is likely to grow.
Many senior Chinese officials appear to view the South China Sea as an area of “core interest” that is as non-negotiable as other sensitive regions like Taiwan and Tibet. Earlier this year, Chinese vessels cut the cables on Vietnamese ships operating in the South China Sea, and over the year there have been at least ten confrontations on the sea between China and the Philippines.
Vietnam and the Philippines–and to a lesser extent Malaysia–are increasingly looking to other outside powers for aid, turning not only to the U.S. Anti-China sentiment in Vietnam is high, and earlier this year the Vietnamese government, which rarely allows protests of any kind, permitted repeated large anti-China demonstrations.
The six largest armed forces in the world operate in the Pacific aria. Military capabilities in the region are increasingly modern due to technical development and economic growth. This enhanced military capability has resulted in several nations possessing the capability to build and deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Other regional nations also have the economic and technical sophistication to develop WMD capabilities on short notice, should they believe a threat exists.
The Obama administration has taken a firm approach to the South China Sea than it did last year, defusing tensions somewhat with Beijing. But Washington will have to play a larger role in the dispute as Southeast Asian nations look outside ASEAN for support. India–a close U.S. partner–is becoming more involved in the South China Sea, and China says its claims are non-negotiable.
US should build a Cold War-style alliance structure. United States will have to make clear not only to treaty allies like the Philippines but also partners like Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia that–while hoping for a written multilateral code of conduct for the South China Sea dispute–the United States will bolster its presence in and around the South China Sea. This would include transferring naval assets from the Atlantic to the Pacific, holding regular exercises with partners near the South China Sea, and building up basing capacity in Asian partners like Australia and Singapore. It also means encouraging the ASEAN nations and India to improve their naval-naval communications with China so as to avoid any deadly mistakes in the South China Sea. The alliance with Japan will be the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region.
Asian-Pacific nations are proud of their cultures and sensitive about issues of independence and sovereignty. These nations are strikingly diverse in size, population, culture, and history. The 43 nations, 20 territories represent 75 official languages and over 20 distinct religions. Security concerns and threats, such as the Korean peninsula, Indo-Pakistani border, and Indonesia, remain US concerns. Local insurrection, territorial disputes, religious and ethnic conflicts, and illegal drug trafficking have economic, political, and military implications for US commandments in that aria.
Russia the big neighbor form west had the PM, Vladimir Putin, in visit to Beijing, to marks this year the 10th anniversary of the treaty on neighborly relations, friendship and cooperation between the two countries. The Russian PM stated: “There is no doubt that both China and Russia are world powers, and each country is itself a major player on the international arena. But Russian-Chinese interaction on the global stage has become a crucial factor in world politics. We’ve learned to act hand-in-hand so as to uphold our legitimate international interests even more effectively”.
With presidential elections in Russia, Taiwan, the United States, and South Korea, as well as the leadership transitions taking place in China and North Korea, 2012 may bring unprecedented changes that seriously affect Asian security dynamics. With the threat of a double-dip global economic recession on the horizon, a strong, comprehensive, and future-oriented alliance is needed for the security of the region.
What is the situation in Middle Orient?
Today’s overwhelmingly civil and secular revolts represent a departure from the Arab politics of the mid-1980s and 1990s. Bolstered by Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, in those days the political class was consumed by the idea of establishing an Islamic order, including a religious state and sharia. Their primary goal was to forge an ideological community through which secular concerns would be addressed. For Islamists, the state was seen as the most powerful and efficient institution for spreading “good” and eradicating “evil.” In turn, Islamists viewed citizens as dutiful subjects and placed an emphasis on their obligations to the righteous state, with little concern for their rights.
It remains to be seen whether the post-Islamist vision can be sustained after the revolutionary fervor subsides. There is certainly the possibility of a renewed fundamentalism. Already in Egypt, Salafists who opposed the revolution are regrouping in the mosques and on the street with a message that democracy is forbidden. One thing is clear, however: democrats, whether faithful or secular, have a heavy task before them.
U.S. President Barack Obama seems to have decided early in his administration that Turkey would be the United States’ primary gateway to the Middle East, and that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would be the leader who could help him implement his grand vision: to reduce the U.S. profile in the Middle East, engage Iran and Syria, and broker a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. The Turkish agenda, developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Erdoğan’s foreign minister, seemed to fit perfectly with Obama’s strategy. It was dubbed “zero problems with neighbors,” and centered on Turkey’s increasing its leadership role across the region, improving its relations with Iran and Syria, and mediating Arab-Israeli peace talks.
Davutoğlu and Erdoğan’s policy of non-alignment works, for a while, to position Turkey as an intermediary between competing blocs — the Iranian alliance system, which includes Syria, and the U.S.-led system, which includes Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, among others. But Turkey failed to do “zero problems with neighbors” -Israel and Iraq. The main problems on the agenda of Middle Orient are still unsolved.
Only a great power could do so and balance the complex agendas of the Middle East’s several regional players. Turkey is not a great power. That role remains the United States’ alone.